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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading regime 
leaves nations the “policy space” to deploy effective policy for long-run diversifi-
cation and development and the extent to which there is a convergence of such 
policy space under global and regional trade regimes. We examine the economic 
theory of trade and long-run growth and underscore the fact that traditional 
theories lose luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic comparative 
advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a “toolbox” of 
policies that have been deployed by developed and developing countries past and 
present to kick-start diversity and development with the hope of achieving long-
run growth. Next, we examine the extent to which rules under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), trade agreements between the European Union (EU) 
and developing countries, trade agreements between the United States (US) and 
developing countries, and those among developing countries (South-South, or 
S-S, agreements) allow for the use of such policies. We demonstrate that there 
is a great divergence among trade regimes over this question. While S-S agree-
ments provide ample policy space for industrial development, the WTO and EU 
agreements largely represent the middle of the spectrum in terms of constraining 
policy space choices. On the far end, opposite S-S agreements, US agreements 
place considerably more constraints by binding parties both broadly and deeply 
in their trade commitments. 
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Development is a long-run process of transforming an economy from 
concentrated assets based on primary products to a diverse set of assets 
based on knowledge. This process involves investing in human, physical, 
and natural capital in manufacturing and services and divesting of rent 
seeking, commerce, and unsustainable agriculture (Amsden 2001, 2-3). 
Imbs and Waczairg (2003) have confirmed that nations that develop 
follow this trajectory. They find that as nations get richer, sectoral pro-
duction and employment move from a relatively high concentration to 
diversity. They find such a process is a long one and that nations do not 
stabilize their diversity until they reach a mean income of over $15,000 
per capita. For many years it has also been known that as countries 
diversify they undergo a process of deepening whereby domestic firms 
improve their internal productive capacities by establishing forward and 
backward linkages in the economy (Hirschman 1958, Krugman 1995, 
Amsden 2001). 
This paper examines the extent to which the emerging world trading 
regime leaves nations the “policy space” to deploy effective policy for 
long-run diversification and development and the extent to which there 
is a convergence of such policy space under global and regional trade 
regimes. Part II of the paper examines the economic theory of trade and 
long-run growth and underscores the fact that traditional theories lose 
luster in the presence of the need for long-run dynamic comparative 
advantages and when market failures are rife. We then review a “tool-
box” of policies that have been deployed by developed and developing 
countries past and present to kick-start diversity and development with 
the hope of achieving long-run growth but also stress that tools alone 
are not the recipe for development, that “getting the political economy 
right” is also of vital importance. In Part III we examine the extent to 
which rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade agree-
ments between the European Union (EU) and developing countries, 
trade agreements between the United States (US) and developing 
countries, and those among developing countries (South-South or S-S 
agreements) allow for the use of such policies. Part IV of the paper 
summarizes our findings and offers conclusions for policy and future 
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research. This paper is intended to assist policy-makers as they choose 
trade partners that affect their ability to design long-run development 
strategies.
I. TRADe TheoRy AND The LoNg RuN
The traditional trade theory that provides the backdrop and justification 
for the majority of trade treaties is limited in terms of long-run growth for 
developing countries. Such theories assume a static approach to techno-
logical change and assume that there are no market failures among trading 
partners, two assumptions that do not hold in the developing country 
context (Caves 2007). This section of the paper provides an overview of 
trade theory and its limitations and shows how some countries have used 
various tools to correct for the theoretical limitations identified.
Neo-classical trade theory shows us that liberalizing trade can make all 
parties better off. The economist David Ricardo showed that because 
countries face different costs to produce the same product, if each coun-
try produces, and then exports, the goods for which it has comparatively 
lower costs, then all parties benefit. The effects of comparative advantage 
(as Ricardo’s notion became called) on factors of production were devel-
oped in the “Heckscher-Ohlin” model. This model assumes that in all 
countries there is perfect competition, technology is constant and read-
ily available, there is the same mix of goods and services, that factors of 
production (such as capital and labor) can freely move between industries, 
and there are no externalities. In other words, this model is “static” and 
not “dynamic” and there are no market failures. 
Within this rubric, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem adds that international 
trade can fetch a higher price for the products (and hence lead to higher 
overall welfare) in which a country has a comparative advantage. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (in other words, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) moving to another country) can contribute to development by 
increasing employment and by human capital and technological “spill-
overs” where foreign presence accelerates the introduction of new technol-
ogy and investment. In theory, the gains from trade accruing to “winning” 
sectors freed to exploit their comparative advantages have the (Pareto) 
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possibility to compensate the “losers” of trade liberalization. Moreover, 
if the net gains from trade are positive, there are more funds available to 
stimulate growth and protect the environment. In a perfect world then, 
free trade and increasing exports could indeed be unequivocally beneficial 
to all parties.
To some, static comparative advantage poses problems for countries 
who want to sustain long-run growth. Some countries may only have a 
static comparative advantage in a single commodity where prices are very 
volatile and where, in the longer run, prices are on the decline relative to 
industrial goods. What’s more, small initial comparative static advantages 
among countries in the short run may expand into a growing technology 
gap between rich and poor nations in the longer run (Lucas 1988, Gross-
man and Helpman 1991). If the developed world has a static comparative 
advantage in innovation, it can continually stay ahead by introducing new 
products, even if the developing world eventually catches up and gains a 
comparative advantage in low-cost production of each old product over 
time (Krugman 1979).
In the longer run then, what 
matters most is not static 
comparative advantage at any 
one moment in time, but the 
ongoing pattern of dynamic 
comparative advantage: the 
ability to follow one success 
with another, to build on one 
industry by launching another, 
again and again. Since the 
process of technology develop-
ment is characterized by increasing returns, many models will have 
multiple equilibria. It is easy to specify a model in which the choice 
between multiple equilibria is not uniquely determined by history; 
rather, it becomes possible for public policy to determine which equi-
librium will occur (Krugman 1991). If, in such a model, the multiple 
equilibria include high-tech, high-growth paths as well as traditional, 
If the developed world has a static 
comparative advantage in innova-
tion, it can continually stay ahead by 
introducing new products, even if the 
developing world eventually catches 
up and gains a comparative advantage 
in low-cost production of each old 
product over time.
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low-growth futures, then public policy may make all the difference in 
development. 
Neo-classical trade theory also assumes that there are no market failures 
among trading partners (Caves 2007). However, four key market failures 
plague nations seeking to catch up to the developed world: coordination 
failures, information externalities, dynamism and technological change, 
and human capital formation. Diversification by definition can mean 
the creation of whole new industries in an economy and sometimes may 
require linking new industry to necessary intermediate goods markets, labor 
markets, roads and ports, and final product markets. For 50 years economic 
theorists have demonstrated how markets fail at “coordinating” these efforts. 
Coordination failures and the asymmetric distribution of world income 
have led economists to argue that the nation state should provide “big push” 
investments to build scale economies and enhance the complementary de-
mand and supply functions of various industries over the long run (Nurkse 
1952, Scitovsky 1954, Chang 2002, Rodrik 2007a).
While historically such efforts took the form of large industrial plan-
ning efforts and infant industry protection, more recently industrial 
clustering has taken place where nations focus on the development of 
specific technologies or sectors in specific geographical regions—espe-
cially when facing scale economies. Clustering and export processing 
zones have been created to attract foreign firms, link them to domestic 
input providers, and serve as exporting platforms (Amsden 2001, 75). 
To support these efforts, nations (most successfully in Asia) provide tax 
breaks and drawbacks to foreign firms but require them to source from 
domestic firms and transfer technology (Amsden 2001, 88). In tandem, 
the state provides an educated labor force, public R&D, tariff protec-
tion, and subsidized credit to support the domestic firms, and provides 
export subsidies to the domestic firms until they can produce products 
at the global technological frontier (Murphy et al. 1989, Amsden 2001, 
Weiss 2005).
Markets also fail at providing the socially optimal amount of information 
to producers and consumers—such phenomena are termed “information 
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externalities.” Technological experimentation through research and devel-
opment and the inquisitive process of entrepreneurship involve a process 
of “self-discovery” regarding which economic activities and product lines 
will be the most appropriate for a domestic economy (Rodrik 2007a, 104–
7). These experimenters who tinker with establishing or inventing new 
technologies to adapt to local conditions provide enormous social value 
to a national economy but solely bear the course of failure (and success). 
These entrepreneurs need to be compensated for their experimental nature 
through subsidization of exports and credit, temporary tariff protection, 
patent rewards, and marketing support. Without such incentives, entre-
preneurs will be more apt to invest in historically profitable industries 
in the primary product sectors. (Hirschman 1958, Gerschenkron 1966, 
 Krugman 1995). 
As hinted earlier, related to coordination failures and information 
externalities is that trade liberalization and comparative advantage tend 
to produce static gains but make dynamic gains through technological 
change more elusive. The static models of the gains from trade sug-
gest that countries such as Brazil should dismantle its industrial sector 
in favor of specializing in soy and meat production, that India should 
de-emphasize services and heavy manufacturing in favor of textile and 
apparel specialization (Ackerman and Gallagher 2008, Anderson et al. 
2005). These models, if deployed 20 years ago would have told South 
Korea and China to focus on rice production. However, following the 
lead of Japan, the United States, and Europe before them, many nations 
in East Asia and Latin America fostered more diversified and higher 
value-added sectors over time (Okimoto 1989, Chang 2002). Thirty-five 
years ago if South Korea and China had relied on comparative advantage 
we might not be driving Kias and Hyundais, using Haier appliances or 
typing on Lenovo laptops.
In enabling the technological capacity of new industries, markets do not 
give the correct investment signals when there are high and uncertain 
learning costs and high levels of pecuniary externalities.1 In other words, 
1. Pecuniary externalities affect third parties through prices fluctuations but not necessarily through 
misallocation of resources.
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technological dynamism that leads to diversification is not guaranteed 
by market reforms alone. For many of the reasons described earlier: weak 
capital markets, restrictive intellectual property laws, lack of informa-
tion, and poor coordination, imperfect competition and the need for 
scale economies, under-investment in technologically dynamic sectors 
can occur (Arrow 1962, Nelson and Winter 1982, Lall 2005). Histori-
cally, to correct for these market failures nations have encouraged joint 
venturing with technological transfer agreements with foreign firms to 
learn technological capabilities; in addition they have invested heavily in 
higher education and publicly funded research and development. What’s 
more, nations have selectively loosened intellectual property rules to 
allow for learning and supported innovative firms through government 
procurement, export subsidies, subsidized capital, and tariff protection 
(Amsden 2001, Lall 2005).
Although mentioned in each of these previous examples, human capital 
formation is also essential for dynamic economic growth and diversifica-
tion. Once again, private markets fall short of supplying human capital 
at a socially optimal level. There are numerous arguments why markets 
undersupply education and that governments should intervene to increase 
the supply of educated workers. Basic literacy and education have positive 
externalities such as improved health and better participation in demo-
cratic processes—in other words the social rate of return on education is 
higher than personal investment. With respect to learning in private firms, 
firms may under-invest in the training of their workers because of fears 
of high labor turnover (Rodrik 1992). East Asian tigers—like developed 
countries before them—spent a great deal of effort providing education 
and training to their people. This was done by spending a significant 
amount of funds on education (including providing scholarships to 
obtain PhDs in developed countries), clustering schools in export process-
ing zones, requiring that foreign firms hire nationals and train them on 
the job, and subsidizing training programs in domestic firms (Kim and 
Nelson 2000, Amsden 2001). Table 1 exhibits an illustrative but far from 
exhaustive list of trade and industrial policies used by East Asian and other 
developing economies over a 40 year period and the market failures such 
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policies address. It is this list of policies that will be expanded upon and 
analyzed in the following section.
Table 1.  Tools for Correcting Market Failures
Market Failure Policy Instrument
Coordination failures  Export subsidies 
Tariff sequencing 
Tax drawbacks 
Clustering 
Infrastructure provision
Information externalities  Administrative guidance 
Subsidized credit 
Tariff sequencing 
Subsidized entrepreneurship 
Selective permission for patents
Scale economies/technological  Tariff sequencing 
dynamism   Technology transfer requirements 
Joint ventures 
Public research and development 
Compulsory licensing 
Selective permission for patents 
Government procurement2 
Human capital formation  Public education 
Employment of local personnel 
Movement of people
Source: Kumar and Gallagher 2007
II. geTTINg The PoLITICAL eCoNoMy RIghT
Some countries have been fairly successful at deploying policies to create 
dynamic comparative advantages and to correct for market failures. In the 
developing world the recent standouts are Taiwan, South Korea, and more 
recently China. Table 2 exhibits average annual growth rates in GDP per 
capita for selected regions of the world from 1960 to 2005.
2. Although countries have used various controls over government procurement to promote local 
 industry, those measures, for purposes of space and time, remain outside the scope of this paper. 
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Table 2.  growth in gDP Per Capita for Selected Regions, 1960 to 2005
 1960–1980 1980–2005 2000–2005
High Income Countries  5.7 2.1 2.8 
(for comparison) 
East Asia and Pacific 3.5 6.6 7.2
China 3.4 8.6 8.6
Latin America and  2.9 0.5 1.4 
the Caribbean 
Source: World Bank 2008
Today’s developing nations look to these success stories as possible models 
for 21st century policy. East Asia experienced 3.5 percent annual per capita 
income growth from 1960 to 1980 and 6.6 percent since 1980—one of the 
most impressive growth trajectories on record. What’s more, such growth 
has also corresponded with reduction in inequality and improvements in 
many other social indicators. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain 
in detail the literature on development in these nations, but experts at-
tribute East Asian growth to four general categories of policies (for useful 
full-length treatments of development in this region and the use of state 
policy tools, see World Bank 1993, Wade 2004, Amsden 2001, and Kim 
and Nelson 2000). 
 •  Targeted industrial policy with reciprocal control mechanisms 
where nations selectively secluded certain industries where they 
wanted to gain dynamic comparative advantages;
 •  Loose intellectual property rules where nations encouraged 
learning from foreign nations through government R&D efforts 
and at times reverse engineering goods from foreign counterparts;
 •  The movement of people across borders for higher educa-
tion and temporary work. The best students were sent to the US 
and Europe to earn degrees in science, mathematics, and tech-
nology, and then came home to work in targeted industries or 
government;
 •  Investment in human capital and public infrastructure where 
governments invested heavily in education and provided infra-
structure, such as roads, ports, and so forth.
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There is considerable debate regarding the extent to which these policies were 
the key drivers of growth in some countries. Nevertheless, at this point there 
is widespread agreement that these policies did have some positive effect on 
economic performance. The debate now centers on what level of effect that was 
(World Bank 1993). It is not the purpose of this paper to enter that debate. Nor 
is it the purpose of this paper to judge the value of those policies for develop-
ment. Rather, based on the evidence that such policies have had some positive 
effect, this paper examines whether developing countries are still given (or keep-
ing) the choice to deploy them under existing and proposed trade rules. 
Whereas the East Asian nations—such as South Korea and Taiwan—man-
aged their integration into the world economy through gradual liberaliza-
tion and some degree of government involvement, nations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) rapidly liberalized their economies in a short 
period of time—along the lines currently being advocated in the Doha 
Round of WTO talks. As we see in Table 2 for LAC, income growth since 
liberalization began in the 1980s has been barely one percent annually. 
Many economists have expressed caution over advising other developing 
countries to follow the same path as East Asia (Noland and Pack 2003). 
First, governments can be pathetic in picking “winners” for industrial policy. 
Many governments have tried to adopt pro-active policies and have failed 
miserably—in other words meeting market failures with government action 
often leads to government failure. Governments have been criticized for not 
being able to pick winning sectors to focus on. Indeed, there are many ex-
amples of governments picking “losers.” South Korea and Taiwan are often 
cited as success stories but Indonesia, Nigeria, and Brazil have had failures 
that have received relatively less attention in scholarly circles (Burton 1983, 
Evans 1995). In addition, subsidization and government involvement has 
been shown to accentuate “rent-seeking” behavior that make it additionally 
difficult for developing country governments to let go of projects that aren’t 
going well or that have already reached maturity (Krueger 1996).
Market failures are not always easy to identify and once they are identified it 
isn’t just a matter of pulling out a policy toolbox, grabbing a tool from one 
of these lists, and hammering away. Indeed, while there is a strong theoreti-
cal justification for pro-active government policy, development success takes 
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much more than the proper rationale and proper policies. Development 
success stories from the 20th century all struck a unique blend between state 
and markets—they got the political economy of industrialization right.
These critiques are quite valid. Without the proper political economy condi-
tions, government intervention can create more problems than they correct 
for. However, the most successful cases in large part circumvented these 
problems because governments designed policies where state actors were 
“embedded” in the private sector and where the state enforced discipline on 
the private sector. We refer to these phenomena as “embedded diagnostics” 
and “reciprocal control mechanisms.”
In the presence of market failures by definition it is hard for the private sec-
tor to interpret the signals and trends it faces in the economy. If firms right 
in the middle of the marketplace can’t always make the best decisions about 
products and processes, what makes us think that governments can make 
better decisions (Burton 1983)?
To circumvent the “picking winners” problem, political economists have 
shown that successful industrializers have had states that were “embedded” 
in the private sector while maintaining “autonomy” from sectional elite 
interests seeking rents. State agencies that are charged with correcting mar-
ket failures have to maintain constant communication and input with the 
private sector (Evans 1995). Such public–private partnerships help both the 
private and public sectors “discover” what the most pertinent market failures and 
other impediments to industrial development are in an economy, and what assets 
there are in the economy that can be built upon, and to pick activities that will 
have the largest economy-wide effects (Rodrik 2007a).
Having a good toolkit and embedded autonomy is still not enough. In fact, pub-
lic–private partnerships could become marriages of corruption and rent-seeking. 
Successful industrial policy has also tamed the tendency of rent-seeking. In order 
for this to work, industrial policy has to be coupled with a good deal of discipline 
and accountability for both private actors and the state. Alice Amsden (2001) has 
referred to the need for “reciprocal control mechanisms.” A control mechanism 
is “a set of institutions that disciplines economic behavior based on a feedback 
of information that has been sensed and assessed” (Amsden 2005). For the East 
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Asian success stories, the key principle behind their use of control mechanisms 
was “reciprocity”:
Reciprocity disciplined subsidy recipients and thereby minimized gov-
ernment failures. Subsidies were allocated to make manufacturing prof-
itable—to convert moneylenders into financiers and importers into 
industrialists—but did not become giveaways. Recipients of subsidies were 
subjected to monitorable performance standards that were redistributive in 
nature and result-oriented. The reciprocal control mechanism thus trans-
formed the inefficiency and venality associated with government interven-
tion into collective good (Amsden 2005, 222).
In other words, firms have performance requirements that when they aren’t met 
lead to a termination of supporting benefits by the state. The most successful 
industrializers were able to abandon projects that were not performing whereas 
others were perpetuated because bureaucrats became hijacked by business interests 
who became dependent on the state. Since public policy may make a difference in 
development, and since it has been used successfully by some developing nations 
to increase diversification and related growth, it is important to understand the 
extent to which such policy space exists today. 
III. TeSTINg FoR PoLICy SPACe IN The WTo AND BeyoND
Of the historical tools for diversity and development, which ones remain avail-
able under the new global trading regime? Do bilateral and regional agreements 
further limit policy space for development? This paper examines four trade-
related areas (goods, services, investment, and intellectual property) across 13 
trade agreements. We compare four US agreements (the North American, Do-
minican Republic-Central American, US-Chile, and US-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreements), four EU agreements (the EU-Chile, EU-Mexico, EU-Tunisia, and 
EU-South Africa agreements), and four South-South agreements (the Southern 
Cone Common Market, the Andean Community, the China-Chile agreement, 
and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement) with the WTO trade disciplines 
to answer the question: to what extent do the various regimes constrain policy 
space for member nations? In undertaking this analysis, we’ll be able to see if 
there is convergence among the bilateral and regional agreements.3 
3. As a caveat before going forward, the agreements within each trade regime are by no means homog-
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Table 3.  Illustrative Tool Box Flexibilities
 WTO and      
 Associated  US EU South-South
Policy Instrument Agreements Agreements Agreements Agreements5
Tariff sequencing Y N N Y
Tax export incentives Y N Y Y
Quantitative restrictions/ N N N N 
import licensing
Safeguards for injurious imports6  Y Y Y Y
Control over sensitive services  Y Y Y Y 
  sectors7
Services quotas N N N Y
Duty of establishment Y N Y Y
Regulation of services8  Y Y Y Y
Movement of natural persons Y N Y Y
Public education Y Y Y Y
Local labor requirements Y N Y Y
Technology transfer Y N Y Y
Domestic content9  N N N Y
Foreign exchange restrictions N N N Y
Infrastructure provision Y Y Y Y
Administrative guidance Y Y Y Y
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship Y Y Y Y
Early-working permission Y N Y Y
High disclosure requirements Y N Y Y
Local production requirements Y N Y Y
Parallel imports Y N Y10  Y
enous. Within each of the principal trade areas, the regimes contain some measure of variation. This 
paper attempts to draw some generalizations about disciplines under each trade regime. Where the agree-
ments significantly depart from each other, however, the difference is noted. 
4. As with all measures under the WTO, even permitted policies are subject to the two pillars of the 
WTO: non-discrimination and national treatment (GATT Arts. I, III). 
5. These South-South arrangements are by far the least uniform. Thus, the designations in this column 
represent generalizations from the later analysis. 
6. Although safeguards are permitted, to some degree, under each agreement, US and S-S agreements 
impose more stringent requirements on safeguarding nations than the WTO, while the EU agreements 
contain some more and some less stringent rules. 
7. Some amount of control is permitted under all agreements, however the US agreements are the only 
ones to employ a negative list approach (see section on Services Trade). 
8. Here, the key difference is whether the balancing test is self-enforcing, as it is under both US and EU 
agreements, or dependent on further rulemaking, as in the case of the WTO. 
9. This and other policies may be permitted despite violating certain WTO rules if they pass as legiti-
mate public welfare regulations. 
10. Although the EU allows some parallel imports, the rules of exhaustion are regional and thus slightly 
more difficult to comply with than those in the WTO.
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Table 3 expands the illustrative list of development policy tools in Table 1 in the 
first column and then provides an overview of whether such policies are permit-
ted under various trading arrangements. A “Y” signifies that the measure is per-
mitted; an “N” indicates that a measure is not permitted. We go into this table 
in great detail below, but what stands out from this partial examination is that 
there is great variation in the amount of policy space available for developing 
countries. In general, the S-S and US agreements represent opposite ends of the 
spectrum, whereas the WTO and EU agreements occupy the middle ground.
An inherent flexibility under all trade regimes lies in the dispute settlement 
system. There exists no overarching global trade police to punish countries 
for violations. Rather, trade partners must bring suit against each other to 
enforce the rules of the agreement. Within the WTO, the flexibility is clear: 
a country may not bring suit under the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU) unless the benefits inured to them under the agreement have 
been “nullified or impaired” by the other country’s actions (Art. 3.8). Even 
under the EU and US models, however, countries generally will not bring a 
complaint against a trade partner absent some financial injury, thus leaving 
very small or poor countries the space to do almost anything permitted by 
domestic law (EU-Chile Art. 184, EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000 Title VI). 
Of greater interest here, however, are the true flexibilities in these FTAs—
providing countries with legal room to design development policy.
Trade Coverage
Examining trade area coverage provides an initial glance into the trade agreement 
trends that we discuss more fully in the following sections. Each trade arrangement 
is unique in its structure and the provisions it contains because the agreements de-
rive from unique negotiations between trading partners. Among the agreements, 
trade coverage varies widely: from basic agreements effectively regulating only 
goods trade to complex agreements that cover trade in goods, services, investment, 
and intellectual property, as well as technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures,11 labor measures and environmental protection. 
US agreements contain, by far, the most comprehensive and uniform trade 
disciplines. Each US agreement governs goods trade, rules of origin, cus-
11. These include measures pertaining to the health of plant and animal life. 
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toms regulation, technical barriers to trade, trade remedies, government 
procurement, investment, cross border trade in services, financial services, 
telecommunications, intellectual property, transparency and dispute settle-
ment. At least three of the four herein studied contain additional provisions 
on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, temporary entry of business per-
sons, electronic commerce, competition policy, labor, and the environment. 
Where trade coverage is concerned, EU-Chile and EU-Mexico contain many 
of the same trade areas as US agreements. EU-South Africa and EU-Tunisia, 
on the other hand, begin to resemble much more closely the WTO structure. 
Neither agreement covers telecommunications, financial services, temporary 
entry of business persons, or electronic commerce. Nor does either agreement 
regulate labor and environmental provisions. A closer look at the substantive 
provisions (discussed in the remainder of the paper) reveals that trade area 
coverage does not always signify heightened trade commitments.
The South-South agreements look even more skeletal in comparison with 
the US regimes. The China-Chile Free Trade Agreement (China-Chile) and 
the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), effectively contain com-
mitments only in the area of goods trade. The Southern Cone Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community (CAN) cover as many 
trade areas as some EU agreements, but, as hinted above, do not necessarily 
mirror the EU commitments. 
Examining trade coverage begins to reveal a pattern among FTAs. While S-S 
agreements tend to exploit the policy space available under the WTO, US 
agreements occupy the other end of the spectrum with broad and deep cover-
age. Meanwhile, the WTO and EU agreements take up the middle ground. 
In the next pages, the trend emerges more forcefully as we explore the specific 
trade areas of goods, services, investment, and intellectual property rights.
goods Trade Policies
Trade in goods constitutes the oldest arena of international trade coopera-
tion and discipline. Within the rules, however, countries have exploited every 
flexibility they could find to promote growth and development. This section 
reviews four primary policies affecting goods trade: tariff sequencing, incen-
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tives for export, non-tariff barriers, and safeguards. Table 4 provides a summary 
of our analysis. We show that, in the area of goods trade, agreements between 
developed and developing countries (North-South or N-S) demonstrate some 
convergence, imposing harsher disciplines on policy makers than those imposed 
under the WTO. However, in some key areas, agreements with the EU more 
closely resemble the WTO disciplines than those of US agreements—hinting 
that two different North-South models may emerge.
Table 4.  goods Checklist
 WTO and     
 Associated US EU
Policy Instrument Agreements Agreements Agreements
Tariff sequencing Y N N
Tax drawbacks/deferrals and EPZs Y N Y
Quantitative restrictions/licensing N N N
Safeguards for injurious imports12  Y Y Y
Safeguards for shortages13  Y Y Y
Safeguards for balance of payments Y N Y
Tariff sequencing    Tariff barriers have long been the preferred trade barriers 
under the WTO and its predecessor and underlying agreement, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because they are easy to measure, 
transparent to apply, and straightforward to liberalize progressively over time. 
Historically, countries have raised and lowered tariffs in accordance with 
the perceived needs or demands of domestic industry. By raising tariffs on 
certain manufactured goods and lowering them on inputs for those goods, for 
example, some countries have encouraged domestic manufacturers without 
exposing them to global competition before they’re ready (Chang 2002).
Under the WTO and its associated agreements, most countries initially bind rates 
significantly higher than their applied rates (for example, WTO Chile Tariff Pro-
file).14 This discrepancy gives them the legal right to raise and lower tariff rates at 
various times to promote industrial development, subject, of course, to the pillars 
of the WTO: national treatment and most favored nation (MFN) treatment. 
12. As mentioned in note 5, the degree of procedural requirements varies greatly between agreements. 
13. Among US and EU disciplines, the rules are not identical across agreements. 
14. Take, for example, Chile’s tariff profile as provided by the WTO. While the simple average bound is 
25.1%, the simple average applied is much lower at 6%. This trend repeats for the countries in this study 
(WTO Current Schedules). 
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In regulating tariff rates, US and EU agreement clearly converge. Under both 
EU and US treaties, countries generally commit to maintaining (by binding) 
tariff rates at or below15 the current applied rates—giving little or no room 
for adjustments upward.16 Table 5 points out the divergence between tariffs 
bound under the WTO and those under a North-South regional or bilateral 
agreement. The table shows that tariffs bound under the regional trade agree-
ments, are largely based on the applied rates17 in the case of photographic 
paper in rolls wider than 610 mm.18 The evidence suggests, then, that coun-
tries negotiating with the US or EU bilaterally may have less bargaining power 
than they do in multilateral negotiations.
Table 5.  Illustrative Tariff Comparison: Photographic paper, in rolls wider 
than 610 mm (%)
 WTO  FTA  Alternate  MFN applied
Country/Agreement binding binding FTA binding19 rate (avg)
Chile 25.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Mexico 35.0 0.020  0.0 11.5
Costa Rica: DR-CAFTA 45.0 10.0 N/A 9.0
Nicaragua: DR-CAFTA 40.0 5.0 N/A 10.0
Honduras: DR-CAFTA 35.0 10.0 N/A 10.0
Guatemala: DR-CAFTA 45.0 10.0 N/A 10.0
Dominican Republic: DR-CAFTA 35.0 8.0 N/A 8.0
US-Singapore 6.5 0.0 N/A 0.0
EU-Tunisia21  38.0 0.0 N/A 15.0
EU-South Africa22  15.0 0.0 N/A 5.0
Source: WTO Current Situation of Schedules and other agreements specified
15. EU agreements also allow for varying transition times to get to the base rate stated in the agreement 
(for example, EU-Tunisia Schedule). 
16. Theoretically, countries choose which sectors to bind and the extent to which they bind them. In 
that way, even S-S arrangements resemble their N-S counterparts. However, a country’s actual ability to 
bargain in favor of sensitive sectors varies from country to country. 
17. That is, the tariff rates already set for that particular country. 
18. This trend repeats itself over and over again in the countries’ individual tariff schedules. Taking a 
simple average of the bound rates under the RTAs and comparing it to the simple average of the MFN 
applied rate across all products would prove this conclusively. Unfortunately, we were unable to find a 
schedules document that would export to a spreadsheet program and take such averages. 
19. This column applies only to Chile and Mexico and represents their commitments under their US 
agreements.
20. This represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over seven years.
21. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. 
22. The FTA binding represents a bound tariff after progressive reduction over five years. 
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Incentives for export    Export incentives constitute another set of poli-
cies commonly employed for purposes of development. A country may 
set up a duty drawback or deferral system to reward companies or indus-
tries that export a certain percentage of their products. These programs 
may be industry or geography-specific.23 Export incentives can encour-
age domestic industry to compete on the global scale and, if employed 
properly, aid in maintaining a healthy trade balance for the country. Un-
like tariff regulation, however, EU and US agreements diverge in their 
treatment of export incentives. While the EU agreements generally take 
a more permissive stance, US agreements almost universally prohibit, or 
at least restrict, them.
Since the GATT “does not consider duty and indirect tax exemptions or 
drawbacks for inputs used for export production at the final stages of fabri-
cation and at the earlier stages as ex-
port subsidies,” it permits countries 
to impose duty drawbacks or defer-
rals on condition of export (Rhee 
1985, 79).24 EU agreements, like the 
GATT, do not directly address the 
use of duty drawbacks, deferrals or 
export processing zones (EPZs) and, 
therefore, appear to permit them. 
Both EU-Chile and EU-Mexico (col-
lectively, the Latin American agree-
ments) prohibit the use of taxation to 
protect domestic industry, which could potentially restrict tax-based export 
incentives (EU-Chile Art. 63, EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000 Art. 13). The 
agreements with Tunisia and South Africa (collectively, the African agree-
23. The latter, geography-specific drawback or deferral programs, are often called Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs). 
24. As Rhee implies, export subsidies, unlike duty drawbacks and deferrals, are categorically prohibited 
under each of these regimes (SCM Annex IA, DR-CAFTA Art. 3.14, US-Chile Art. 3.16, NAFTA 
Art. 705). Mexico’s maquiladora program provides a ready example of an export incentive system. 
Under NAFTA, however, “maquila firms were granted a seven-year phase-in period during which they 
continued to enjoy duty-free importation benefits.” This ended in January 2001, when NAFTA Art. 303 
entered into effect (Sargent and Matthews 2001, 1741).
Export incentives can encourage 
domestic industry to compete on the 
global scale and, if deployed properly, 
aid in maintaining a healthy trade 
balance for the country...While the 
EU agreements generally take a more 
permissive stance, US agreements 
almost universally prohibit, or at least 
restrict, them.
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ments), on the other hand, implicitly permit drawbacks by limiting the 
amounts to that of the original tax (EU-Tunisia Art. 22, EU-S.A. Art. 21).25 
By contrast, US agreements almost universally prohibit duty drawbacks or 
deferrals on condition of certain performance requirements (NAFTA Art. 
303, US-Chile Art. 3.8, DR-CAFTA Art. 3.4).26 NAFTA prohibits draw-
backs and deferrals provided that goods are “subsequently exported to the 
territory of another Party, [] used as material in the production of another 
good that is subsequently exported . . ., or [] substituted by an identical or 
similar good used as a material in the production of another good that is 
subsequently exported . . .” in a specified amount. Parties to NAFTA also 
must not “refund, waive or reduce” specified non-tax duties on condition 
of export (NAFTA Art. 303). US-Chile and DR-CAFTA differ slightly, in 
that they proscribe parties from adopting new customs duties waivers, or 
continuing an existing waiver conditioned on performance requirements. 
“Performance requirements” under these agreements include export level 
or percentage requirements, domestic product substitution requirements, 
domestic goods preference, domestic content requirements, and foreign 
exchange restrictions (US-Chile Art. 3.24, DR-CAFTA Art. 3.31).27 Thus, 
US agreements represent a separate model from that of the EU (drawn from 
the GATT) that more tightly constrains policymakers.28 
Non-tariff barriers and restrictions    Unlike tariffs, other trade barriers 
(non-tariff barriers or NTBs) have faced restrictions under almost all mod-
ern international trading regimes. Some common NTBs include quantita-
tive restrictions (quotas), import licensing, and import and export price 
requirements. GATT Article XI prohibits both “instituting” and “maintain-
ing” quantitative restrictions except to prevent or relieve shortages of food 
25. This provision seems to be aimed at preventing hidden export subsidies—payments called “draw-
backs” or “deferrals” by the government, but which actually exceed the amount of the tax.
26. The one exception here is US-Singapore.
27. This does not include conditions, however, that the good be subsequently exported and other such 
rules as required under NAFTA Art. 303.1
28. According to Sargent and Matthews, a second aspect of bilateral agreements may lower the ability of 
a country to create export incentives. Rules of origin, present in all US agreements and most EU agree-
ments, may lower the ability of export-oriented firms to compete with local firms for intra-regional trade 
since export firms have the propensity to have non-regional inputs (Sargent and Matthews 2001, 1741). 
This negative externality of the rules of origin may have a lesser effect within EU arrangements since the 
EU encompasses many countries—creating more regional options for acquiring inputs.
21st Century Trade Agreements 21
or essential products, to apply local standards for “classification, grading 
or marketing of commodities in international trade,” or to enforce certain 
measures governing the domestic production of agricultural or fisheries 
products. WTO disciplines also make allowances for quotas in the case 
of a country’s balance of payments difficulties (GATT Art. XII). Further-
more, the WTO treats import licensing schemes as quantitative restrictions, 
regulating them under the Agreement on Import Licensing (WTO Import 
Licensing). Finally, Article XI mentions “other measures” that act as a prohi-
bition or restriction on import—potentially leaving room for disputes about 
non-quota, non-license measures. 
Here again, US and EU agreements diverge enough to hint that two dif-
ferent models of NTB disciplines are emerging. EU agreements contain 
substantially WTO-equivalent language. The Latin American agreements, 
which are more comprehensive, prohibit quotas, import licensing and 
“other measures” just as in GATT Art. XI (EU-Chile Art. 76, EU-Mexico 
Decision 2/2000 Art. 12). The African agreements, on the other hand, pro-
hibit only quotas explicitly (EU-S.A. Art. 19, EU-Tunisia Art. 19). 
US agreements also contain WTO-equivalent language, but with an added 
prohibition on import and export price requirements. Both US-Chile (Art. 
3.11(2)) and DR-CAFTA (Art. 3.8(2)) further prohibit import licenses 
conditioned on performance requirements while also forbidding voluntary 
export restraints.29 Although slight, the US trend toward deeper trade com-
mitments continues to emerge in NTB disciplines.
Safeguards    A final set of goods trade policies aimed at development, 
safeguards have long been employed by countries facing sudden injurious 
levels of imports, balance of payments difficulties, and critical food short-
ages. GATT Articles XII and XIX place some constraints on safeguards by 
subjecting them to detailed procedural requirements. Safeguard measures 
under the WTO may include quantitative restrictions, suspending tariff 
concessions or raising tariff rates (GATT Arts. XII, XIX). The Agreement 
on Safeguards (Art. 7) further imposes maximum time limits on safeguard 
29. DR-CAFTA also expressly incorporates the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing, and imposes an 
additional notification requirement (Art. 3.9).
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measures. First codified within the global trading regime, bilateral and 
regional agreements have adopted safeguard provisions with similar condi-
tions. EU and US agreements differ, however, in both their treatment of 
quantitative restrictions and the availability of transitional safeguards. 
Like the WTO, EU agreements permit safeguards for injurious imports, bal-
ance of payments difficulties and shortages.30 In the Latin American agree-
ments, the EU mirrors GATT Article XII, permitting suspension of tariff 
concessions, increasing tariff rates and imposing quantitative restrictions 
as safeguards. At the same time, the agreements are careful to ensure that 
safeguard measures do not “exceed what is necessary to remedy the difficul-
ties which have arisen” (EU-Chile Art. 92, EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000 
Art. 15) and they give priority “to those [measures] which least disturb the 
functioning of” the agreement as a whole (EU-Tunisia Art. 27).31 Despite 
this caution, the African agreements permit transitional safeguards, which 
face more relaxed procedural requirements and may be imposed solely to 
protect infant industry (EU-Tunisia Art. 14; EU-S.A. Art. 25).
US agreements, on the other hand, permit safeguard measures only for 
injurious import levels and balance of payments difficulties.32 Safeguard 
measures may include suspending concessions or raising duties but not im-
posing quantitative restrictions. Furthermore, US agreements require that, 
in the case of injury by imports, the imports not only cause serious injury 
or threat thereof (GATT language), but that they be the substantial cause of 
that injury—a higher legal standard (US-Singapore Art. 7.1; US-Chile Art. 
8.1; DR-CAFTA, Art. 8.1; NAFTA Art. 801).33 Thus, once more, US agree-
ments represent a broader and deeper model of trade commitments. 
30. The Latin American agreements allow safeguards in all three of these cases (EU-Chile Arts. 92, 93, 
195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2000 Arts. 15, 16, 21).  The African agreements, however, circumscribe 
the application of safeguards somewhat more (EU-Tunisia Arts. 25-26 (excluding express safeguards for 
balance of payments); EU-S.A. Arts. 24, 26 (no allowance for goods trade safeguards for balance of pay-
ments difficulties or shortages). 
31. The legal standard imposed varies among EU agreements.  While the EU-Chile agreement constrains 
safeguard use to situations where the injured Member has a “substantial interest” in the injured industry 
(EU-Chile Art. 92), other agreements seem to broaden the scope of the WTO rules and allow safeguards 
even to protect against “serious deterioration of economic situation” (EU-Tunisia Art. 25). 
32. Since the agreements mention nothing about shortages, safeguards to protect against them are 
presumed prohibited.
33. The only US agreement to take special consideration of developing countries, DR-CAFTA Art. 
8.1(4) places limitations on imposing safeguards against developing countries.
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Bilateral models and South-South responses    Each of these trade regimes 
has tied policymakers’ hands in different ways and to a different extent. The 
above examples demonstrate conclusively that the global trading regime under 
the WTO and its associated agreements have, thus far, preserved more policy 
space in goods trade for developing nations than have most bilateral and 
regional arrangements—in particular those with the global North. Taking the 
analysis further, however, shows 
that, rather than converge, US and 
EU agreements have formed two 
distinct models of trade disci-
pline—the latter allowing more 
policy flexibility than the former. In 
addition to these two North-South 
models, developing countries have 
established a third option, joining 
together to form South-South trad-
ing blocs. Several arrangements studied here offer examples of provisions that 
tend to exploit WTO policy flexibility, leaving open even more policy options 
aimed at diversification and development.
To allow tariff sequencing, both SAFTA and MERCOSUR provide for 
“sensitive lists” or wholesale exceptions to the general liberalization program 
(SAFTA Art. 7.3, MERCOSUR Goods, Art. 6). Under SAFTA, even quan-
titative restrictions need not be eliminated for products on the “sensitive 
lists” (Art. 7.5). SAFTA also recognizes the special needs of lesser developed 
countries, allowing “greater flexibility . . . in continuation of quantitative 
and other restrictions provisionally and without discrimination in critical 
circumstances by the Least Developed Contracting States” (Art. 11(b)). In 
addition to permitting tax drawbacks and deferrals, some S-S arrangements, 
such as China-Chile, exempt all tax issues from coverage by the agreement, 
leaving contracting states plenty of freedom to use tax incentives for indus-
trial and other development (China-Chile Art. 101).
Notably, these agreements fairly tightly constrain the use of safeguards 
against fellow developing states. The CAN permits safeguards for injurious 
imports only when the Trade Liberalization Program causes or threatens 
The global trading regime under the 
WTO and its associated agreements 
have, thus far, preserved more policy 
space in goods trade for developing 
nations than have most bilateral and 
regional arrangements—in particular 
those with the global North.
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“serious economic damage”—but prohibits them against certain products 
(Arts. 96, 99). The CAN General Secretariat acts as a gatekeeper, regulating 
the use of safeguards (Arts. 85, 95). MERCOSUR allows them for injurious 
imports “only in exceptional cases” and makes no room for safeguards for 
balance of payments or shortages (MERCOSUR Safeguards Art. 1). SAFTA 
permits them (except for shortages) but contains a special consideration for 
Lesser Developed Countries, limiting safeguards against them (Art. 16.8). 
This provision may hold the key to why South-South arrangements seem 
to constrain safeguard usage—largely because safeguards would allow more 
developed members to impose safeguards on the imports of their lesser 
 developed counterparts.
Trade in goods has ceased to be the most important area of trade regulation, 
however. Global trade disciplines have increased in scope in the past 15 
years to impose constraints on services trade regulation, treatment of foreign 
investment, and intellectual property protection, among others. The follow-
ing sections explore these trade-related policy areas and the extent to which 
trade agreements impact policymakers’ decisions today.
Trade in Services
Since the Uruguay Round in 1994, global trade in services has increased 
dramatically both in quantity and importance. Some of the fastest-growing 
sectors, like computer-related services, legal, advertising and technical ser-
vice jobs, other business activities, and research and development grew be-
tween 70 and 250 percent from 1994 to 2004. Of 54 bilateral and regional 
agreements with services trade provisions, only five predate the Uruguay 
round (Perera 2007, 3). Prior to the Uruguay Round, countries were able to 
retain control over sensitive sectors, impose quota equivalents for services, 
require joint ventures from foreign service suppliers, control the establish-
ment of foreign service suppliers, impose safeguards, and employ domestic 
regulation to control the impact of the services trade. 
Today, however, the new global trading regime and bilateral and regional 
agreements circumscribe their efforts to varying degrees. In many ways, 
disciplines over trade in services are more uniform among trade agreements 
than are other areas of trade. Table 6 provides a general picture of where 
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the three primary regimes studied here converge and diverge. The following 
discussion explains the practical constraints that services agreements place 
on policymakers and discusses whether services trade disciplines converge.
Table 6.  Services Checklist
 WTO and     
 Associated US EU
Policy Instrument Agreements Agreements Agreements
Maintaining control over sensitive sectors34  Y Y Y
Services Quotas and Restrictions N N N
Organization type requirements N N N
Duty of establishment Y N Y
Withholding right of establishment Y N N35 
Safeguards Y N N
Freedom to regulate service supply36  Y Y Y
Movement of natural persons Y N Y
Retaining control over sensitive sectors    Many countries have desired 
to maintain control over certain sectors of their services economy. These 
sectors may include “essential services, network infrastructure services, and 
financial services” (Oxfam 2008, 2). Theoretically, countries have broad 
capacity to maintain control over sensitive sectors through the negotiation 
process. The most significant difference between the agreements, however, 
lies in the method by which sectors are bound. 
The multilateral trading system adopts what has been called a “positive-list 
approach,” which means that protection is the rule rather than the excep-
tion (Marconini 2006, 12). Thus, unless the country places a sector on the 
list, it can remain unbound. The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) Articles IV and XIX also make special allowances for lesser 
developed countries (LDCs), permitting them to liberalize later. The GATS 
even defines “public services” so that they are not bound by the rules of the 
34. While some amount of control is permitted under all agreements, US agreements employ a negative 
list rather than the positive list approach of the GATS and EU agreements. 
35. Here, the EU agreements could be evolving to look more like US agreements but the rules are not 
consistent across the four treaties.
36. As mentioned in note 7, the difference here is that the balancing test for regulations is self- 
enforcing under the EU and US agreements, while enforcement under the WTO requires further 
 rulemaking. 
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agreement (Art. I:3). Although this method seems broadly permissive, the 
WTO inherently contains the expectation of full liberalization across sectors 
(GATS Annex on Art. II Exemptions).
The EU agreements, likewise, have adopted a positive-list approach.37 And 
like the WTO, with the exception of EU-Tunisia, these agreements call 
for the eventual elimination of “substantially all remaining discrimination 
between the parties” in all sectors and all modes of supply (EU-Mexico 
Decision 2/2001 Art. 7.3; EU-Chile Art. 100; EU-S.A. Art. 30.1). Some 
EU agreements, represented by the EU-Mexico arrangement, pronounce a 
standstill on future measures inconsistent with liberalization, and include a 
most-favored-nation (MFN) provision that prohibits Mexico from deciding 
“with which regions [it] would like to integrate most or first” (Oxfam 2008, 
5; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Arts. 5, 7). 
The pivotal difference between the US and the EU models is that US 
agreements employ a negative list approach—making liberalization, not 
protection, the rule (Marconini 2006, 12). Practically speaking, this 
means that countries have to negotiate for every sector they want to 
protect, making it more negotiation 
intensive for nations to maintain 
control over their sensitive sectors. 
At the same time, US agreements 
also permit countries (theoretically) 
to make reservations to the MFN 
principle, to reserve room for future 
measures that are inconsistent with 
the agreement, and to select whole sectors to be untouched (permanently) 
by the agreement, options which are less available under an EU or WTO 
framework (Marconini 2006, 8; NAFTA Art. 1206; DR-CAFTA Art. 
11.6; US-Chile Art. 11.6; US-Singapore Art. 8.7). What has yet to be 
37. Although the four EU agreements studied here contain actual services commitments only to varying 
degrees, each contains a reference to the positive list approach stated in their negotiating mandate at the 
very least (EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 7.3, EU-Chile Art. 99, EU- S.A. Art. 29.1, EU-Tunisia Art. 
32.1). 
The pivotal difference between the 
US and the EU models is that US 
agreements employ a negative list 
approach—making liberalization, not 
protection, the rule.
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seen is whether the commitment to complete liberalization will come to 
completion under any of the EU trading arrangements. If so, develop-
ing countries that seek EU trade preferences for the policy flexibility they 
provide may end up with more policy restrictions than they originally 
bargained for, 20 or 30 years down the road.
“Non-Tariff Barriers” in services: quota equivalents for services trade    
Just as in goods trade, countries have often attempted to protect a domestic 
services industry or control the behavior of service suppliers by imposing 
quantitative restrictions on services trade. For the most part, no modern 
international trade agreement permits these measures. The GATS sets out 
the template for treatment of services trade in this area. It prohibits service 
supplier quotas, service transaction or asset restrictions, service output quo-
tas, and service employment limitations in bound sectors.38 These limita-
tions are prohibited whether they come “in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic 
needs test” (GATS Art. XVI:2). 
Modern trade agreements take a largely harmonized approach to services 
quota regulation. The EU-Latin American agreements employ GATS- 
identical language when it comes to services quotas (EU-Chile Art. 97; 
EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 4). The African agreements mention no 
such limitations directly, but the Parties incorporate “strict observance of the 
[GATS]” (EU-S.A. Art. 29; EU-Tunisia Art. 32.1). With the exception of 
NAFTA, US agreements also employ GATS language, prohibiting the same 
behavior with an exception for existing non-conforming measures set out 
in the schedules (DR-CAFTA Art. 11.4; US-Chile Art. 11.4; US-Singapore 
Art. 8.5).39 Here, as in the previous section, the distinct binding approaches 
of the two models make the difference. While under the EU arrangements, 
only committed sectors are bound by the rules of market access, under US 
agreements, all are bound except sectors explicitly excluded.
38. This section also prohibits two other measures: requiring a certain organization type for service sup-
pliers and foreign capital participation limits – both of which will be addressed in the coming sections.
39. The exception to many of these rules is NAFTA, since it came about so much earlier—on this 
subject it states: “The Parties shall periodically, but in any event at least every two years, endeavor to 
negotiate the liberalization or removal of the quantitative restrictions set out in Annex V pursuant to 
paragraphs 1 through 3” ( NAFTA Art. 1207(4)).
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Joint venture requirements    Countries have also, historically, controlled 
the behavior of foreign service suppliers by organization-type requirements 
and limits on foreign capital participation. This forces foreign services 
or suppliers to partner with a local company or person, and allows local 
nationals to control the direction of the company, necessarily transferring 
some technology and know-how into the domestic economy. Today, how-
ever, joint venture requirements, like quotas, are almost universally prohib-
ited under international services agreements. 
As above, the GATS provides the textual template for this discipline stating 
that where market commitments are undertaken member countries may 
not impose “measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity 
or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service.” It 
also prohibits placing limits on foreign capital participation (GATS Art. 
XVI:2(e)-(f )). The EU-Latin American agreements again mimic the GATS 
disciplines, prohibiting both legal entity requirements and foreign capital 
restrictions (EU-Chile Art. 97; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 4). The 
African agreements, as mentioned above, incorporate GATS commitments, 
but make no additional reference to services organization requirements.
US agreements differ slightly from the EU—in that they do not outright 
prohibit placing limits on foreign capital participation in their services 
agreements (DR-CAFTA Art. 11.4; US-Chile Art. 11.4; US-Singapore Art. 
8.5).40 More important, for purposes of this discussion, US agreements 
regulate foreign capital participation under the investment rather than the 
services chapters. The investment chapter governs some amount of foreign 
participation in domestically located firms by forbidding that countries 
“materially impair” the ability of the investor to exercise control over its in-
vestment” (DR-CAFTA Art. 10.10; US-Singapore Art. 15.9; US-Chile Art. 
10.10; NAFTA Art. 1107). US agreements also provide a universal right of 
establishment to firms from partner countries, a discipline discussed in more 
detail below. Both the “material impairment” provision and the right of es-
tablishment would effectively proscribe joint venture requirements. Further-
more, the investment chapter is not sector-specific and therefore binds even 
more broadly than the US’ negative list approach to service commitments.
40. Once more, NAFTA is the exception to this rule and does not mention either of these disciplines.
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Duties and rights of establishment    Policies influencing establishment 
rights represent another area traditionally employed to promote develop-
ment. Controlling establishment, either by imposing a duty or withholding 
a right of establishment, allows 
policymakers to influence who 
does business in their territory. By 
imposing a duty of establishment41 
countries force service suppliers 
“to establish or maintain a rep-
resentative office or any form of 
enterprise, or to be resident in its 
territory as a condition for the cross-border supply of a service” (NAFTA 
Art. 1205). Withholding a “right of establishment,” on the other hand, al-
lows countries to select which service suppliers they want in their territory, 
and keep out those they do not. 
Investment and services agreements rarely regulate the duty of establish-
ment. Neither the GATS nor EU agreements mention such duty. However, 
if applied to bound sectors, such measures would likely have to be in the 
schedule for continued liberalization (Marconini 2006, 9). US agreements, 
on the contrary, expressly forbid parties from imposing such a duty by pro-
hibiting local presence requirements (NAFTA Art. 1205; DR-CAFTA Art. 
11.5; US-Chile Art. 11.5; US-Singapore Art. 8.6).42 
As for the right of establishment, the GATS does not explicitly require that 
Member countries impose no requirements on the establishment of invest-
ments made by a foreign investor (Marconini 2006, 9).43 Yet again, for 
bound sectors, such measures would likely need to be scheduled for liberal-
ization. Once more, US agreements include as a part of national treatment 
41. Also known as the “right of non-establishment.”
42. One author mentions that while the US agreements contain clearer language about the prohibition 
of duty of establishment clauses, they may not necessarily be “more forceful in actually putting them into 
effect” (Marconini 2006, 9).
43. Though this may apply more directly to the trade-related investment measures, services and invest-
ment are intricately connected and often treated under the same agreement except in US treaties.  
Furthermore, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) makes no mention of 
rights of establishment for foreign companies either in the text of the agreement or in the Illustrative List 
of inconsistent measures (TRIMS Annex).
Controlling establishment, either by 
imposing a duty or withholding a right 
of establishment, allows policymakers 
to influence who does business in  
their territory.
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that “[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors 
with respect to the establishment . . . of investments in its territory” (DR-
CAFTA Art. 10.2, emphasis added).
More variation exists among EU treaties. While traditionally, the agree-
ments have not contained a right of establishment, recent agreements have 
incorporated that right to varying degrees (Oxfam 2008, 3). EU-Chile, for 
example, contains a separate section (Chapter III) mandating that “with 
respect to establishment, each Party shall grant to legal and natural persons 
of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own legal and natural persons performing a like economic activity” (Art. 
132). EU-Mexico makes no mention of establishment within the services 
section, but explicitly mentions the right of establishment for suppliers of 
financial services (EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 12). Under the EU-
Tunisia agreement, the parties have not yet reached a decision on the matter 
of establishment, but have agreed to address it in the future (EU-Tunisia 
Art. 31).44 Some evidence suggests, then, that EU disciplines may converge 
with US commitments in the area of establishment in the future (Oxfam 
2008, 3). This trend is not prevalent enough, however, to conclude general 
convergence in establishment disciplines.
Services safeguards    Safeguard regulation arises separately under ser-
vices trade. In general, most of the permitted safeguard measures for goods 
involve tariff levels—a measure not directly applicable to services trade. 
Here, GATS commitments clearly permit more flexibility than bilateral and 
regional agreements, and the US exceeds both the GATS and the EU in 
restricting the use of safeguards. GATS Article XII allows “[m]embers [to] 
adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in services on which it has under-
taken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for transac-
tions related to such commitments.” Furthermore, Article X proposes an 
Emergency Safeguard Mechanism for situations in which waiting the period 
required under the general safeguard provisions would cause hardship to the 
country (though this mechanism has not yet been established). 
44. The EU-South Africa agreement uniquely does not even contain an agreement to discuss the issue in 
the future.
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With the exception of EU-Chile, EU agreements generally omit mention 
of service-related safeguards. The EU-Chile agreement permits parties to 
“adopt or maintain restrictive measures with regard to trade in goods and 
in services and with regard to payments and capital movements, includ-
ing those related to direct investment,” but only for balance of payments 
difficulties” (EU-Chile Art. 195, emphasis added). The US model more 
uniformly excludes services safeguards, mentioning only suspension of tariff 
reduction and raising tariff rates (NAFTA Arts. 801, 2104; DR-CAFTA 
Arts. 8.1, 21.4; US-Chile Arts. 8.1, 23.4; US-Singapore Art. 7.1).
Domestic regulation    Possibly one of the most domestically invasive sets 
of provisions in trade agreements addresses the issues of domestic regula-
tion of service suppliers. Traditionally, domestic regulation remained under 
the purview of the domestic policymakers. However, with international 
trading partners concerned that other countries would use regulation to 
discriminate against their goods and services, the GATS, as well as regional 
and bilateral agreements, impose some limits on the use of domestic regula-
tion. In this way, the EU and US agreements have converged by employing 
the GATS standard for legitimate regulation while stepping up the binding 
nature of that standard. 
The GATS spells out the universal standard for balancing legitimate regulation 
with trade liberalization: that “measures of general application affecting trade in 
services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner,” and 
“that such requirements are, inter alia: (a) based on objective and transparent 
criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; (c) in the case of 
licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service” 
(GATS Art. VI:1, 4). The subtle, but important, difference between the GATS 
and its bilateral or regional counterparts, however, is that the standard is self-
enforcing under the US and some EU agreements. That is, the parties to those 
treaties must meet those standards or risk violating the agreement. By contrast, 
the GATS provision acts only as a basis for future rulemaking by the Council 
for Trade in Services (DR-CAFTA Art. 11.8; US-Chile Art. 11.8; US-Singapore 
Art. 8.8; NAFTA Art. 1210; EU-Chile Art. 102).45 
45. Other EU agreements contain more varied language.  EU-Mexico, the only other EU agreement here 
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Human capital development    Two key ways that countries have 
attempted to develop local human capital and promote development gener-
ally are through the free movement of persons across borders and heavy 
investments in public education. The GATS governs the former by schedul-
ing commitments to liberalize migration and immigration. This represents 
one area that developing countries have traditionally liberalized (rather 
than protected) in order to promote human capital growth. Ironically, US 
services agreements permit broad-reaching restrictions on the free move-
ment of persons by simply not covering it within the scope of their services 
provisions (DR-CAFTA Art. 11.1). EU trade agreements do allow for such 
commitments, but in most cases, the EU offers in this area are minimal 
(EU-Chile Art. 95; Oxfam 2008, 5). In the area of public education, on the 
other hand, countries are generally limited only by their domestic political 
and economic situations.
South-South responses to bilateral services trade disciplines    Across 
the board, international trading regimes have limited the policy op-
tions available to policymakers who could use public policy to promote 
diversification and growth. Furthermore, diminished differences between 
the trade agreements could lead to a slight trend in services disciplines 
convergence, rather than the emergence of two separate bilateral mod-
els. Differences still exist, however, as shown by the varying approaches 
to binding, the unique way that US agreements treat investment disci-
plines, and the simple fact that US agreements represent a more uni-
form, comprehensive approach. 
Surprisingly, South-South arrangements have done little to either pre-
serve or increase policy space with respect to services measures. Neither 
China-Chile nor SAFTA includes a section on services, and the CAN, 
under Secretariat Decision 439, contains only minimal services obliga-
tions (CAN Services Arts. 14-16). As a result, these agreements implic-
to contain a substantive services section, contains a much more vague “regulatory carve out” permit-
ting parties to “regulate the supply of services in its territory, in so far as regulations do not discriminate 
against services and service suppliers of the other Party in comparison to its own like services and service 
suppliers” (EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 8). The EU-South Africa and EU-Tunisia agreements have 
only a skeletal services section, more of an agreement to agree than a commitment to liberalize services 
immediately (EU-S.A. Art. 30; EU-Tunisia Art. 31).
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itly retain the flexibilities existent under the WTO and GATS but gain 
nothing in addition. MERCOSUR’s Montevideo Protocol, by far the 
most comprehensive services section, contains largely GATS-equivalent 
language, especially regarding market access commitments (Art. IV). 
The CAN allows safeguards in services trade for “serious external finan-
cial or balance of payments problems,” but does little else to preserve 
policy flexibility (CAN Services Art. 20).
Trade in services has come to mean, in addition to cross-border trade and 
movement of people, the supply of services “through commercial presence 
abroad;” that is, foreign firms setting up shop in a host country (GATS Art. 
I:2). Although largely treated under services disciplines within the WTO 
and EU frameworks, the US has set out a new model for these disciplines 
that much more rigidly constrains the use of domestic measures to control 
foreign investors and service suppliers. The next section demonstrates the 
distinct models arising out of international investment regulation and shows 
how developing countries have protected their ability to regulate in spite of 
these disciplines. 
Investment
Closely related to trade in services—in fact, included within many services 
trade provisions—is treatment of foreign investment. “Investment” in this 
case includes both foreign capital and foreign companies. Countries have 
historically had at their fingertips numerous creatively crafted investment 
measures aimed to protect domestic industry, preserve their current and 
capital account balances, create local backward and forward linkages, and 
otherwise strengthen their economy. Many of them address the treatment of 
FDI, while some place more direct control over foreign capital by govern-
ing foreign portfolio investment (FPI). Table 7 lays out the current avail-
ability of these measures under the various trading regimes. In the following 
section, this paper shows conclusively that the US has established a model 
of investment agreements distinct from and more restrictive than both the 
WTO disciplines and the EU agreements.
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Table 7.  Investment Checklist
 WTO and     
 Associated US EU
Policy Instrument Agreements Agreements Agreements
Domestic content N N N
Trade balancing N N N
Foreign exchange restrictions N N N
Domestic sales restrictions N N N
Domestic regulations, licensing,    
  certifications46  Y N47  Y
Local labor requirements Y N48  Y
Local management requirements Y N Y
Headquarters/production restrictions Y N Y
Technology transfer Y N Y
Research and development Y N Y
Domestic producer preference N N Y49 
Infrastructure provisions Y Y Y
Subsidized credit/entrepreneurship Y Y Y
Administrative guidance Y Y Y
International transfer/payment restrictions N N N
Direct investment protection and promotion    Under the WTO disci-
plines, member countries have much more freedom to regulate foreign direct 
investors in an effort to promote development and acquire the industrial 
know-how of the developed world. The Agreement on Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures (TRIMS) lays out an illustrative list of prohibited measures in 
an appended Annex. The Annex provides examples of measures that violate 
national treatment and the rules against quantitative restrictions: domestic or 
local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, foreign exchange 
restrictions, and domestic sale requirements. Under the TRIMS illustrative 
annex, governments cannot require that investors “purchase or use . . . prod-
ucts of domestic origin or from any domestic source” whether by requiring 
them to use certain products, or a certain value of local products, or that a cer-
tain proportion of local production come from domestic inputs. Governments 
46. Some of the provisions may be permitted implicitly or by related provisions or simply by omission.
47. Many of these measures are not permitted under the US rubric, except as a legitimate domestic 
regulation. 
48. For local labor requirements, local management requirements, headquarters restrictions, technology 
transfer and research and development, a country may not require them as a condition of entry, but may 
condition receipt of a benefit on them.
49. In EU agreements, these measures may be effectively proscribed by other rules.
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also may not require that investors only import a certain volume of their local 
production based on how much they export or produce locally (Annex:1). 
Furthermore, developing country governments may not attempt to balance 
their capital accounts by only allowing foreign investors to acquire foreign 
exchange through export. Finally, governments may not restrict the amount 
an investor exports or sells domestically by requiring domestic sale of certain 
products, or of a certain value of local production, or of a proportion of the 
value of local production (Annex:2; Correa & Kumar 2003).
Notably absent from this list are numerous other measures historically ap-
plied to promote local development, including requirements to employ local 
labor, incorporate local management, maintain headquarters or production 
facilities locally, transfer technology developed locally, and undertake research 
and development locally. Countries may also provide needed infrastructure, 
subsidized or directed credit in key industries, and administrative guidance 
to multinational companies seeking to expand in to local markets. Of course, 
these measures remain subject to the pillars of national treatment and MFN 
treatment under the WTO, as do all measures of WTO member countries, 
but none are mentioned expressly in the agreements. In fact, the GATS per-
mits developing countries to attach some conditions to their services liberal-
ization commitments with development in mind (Art. XIX).
EU agreements contain very little on treatment of foreign investors or in-
vestments. Of the agreements stud-
ied, only the EU-Chile agreement 
conveys a general right of establish-
ment for foreign firms (EU-Chile 
Ch. III).50 Thus, the flexibilities 
existent within the GATS and 
TRIMS are largely present in EU 
agreements as well. Just as EU-Chile grants the right of establishment to 
foreign investors, it also states that, subject to the rule on national treatment 
with respect to establishment, “each Party may regulate the establishment 
of legal and natural persons” (Art. 133). In EU agreements, silence, rather 
50. While the other EU agreements incorporate sections titled “Services and Establishment,” as mentioned 
above, they are largely agreements to agree in the future rather than active commitments between the parties.
In EU agreements, silence, rather than 
the presence of permissive provisions, 
preserves flexibility for domestic regu-
lation of foreign enterprises.
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than the presence of permissive provisions, preserves flexibility for domestic 
regulation of foreign enterprises.
Comparatively, US agreements constrain policies toward foreign investors to 
a much greater degree. US agreements prohibit imposing any performance 
requirements “in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an invest-
ment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory.” These prohib-
ited performance requirements include export level requirements, domestic 
content requirements, local goods or producer preference, trade balancing, 
foreign exchange restrictions, domestic sales restrictions, and technology trans-
fer requirements. In addition to the above prohibitions, the same provisions 
prohibit conditioning “the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage” on 
domestic content of goods, local goods or producer preference, trade balanc-
ing requirements, foreign exchange or domestic sales restrictions (NAFTA Art. 
1106; DR-CAFTA Art. 10.9; US-Chile Art. 10.9; US-Singapore Art. 15.8). 
Some flexibility exists implicitly by noting what is absent from the above 
list; countries may condition receipt of an advantage on export levels, tech-
nology transfer, and domestic supply. US treaties also permit countries to 
condition “the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage . . . on compli-
ance with a requirement to locate production, supply a service, train or em-
ploy workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out research 
and development, in its territory” (NAFTA Art. 1106; DR-CAFTA Art. 
10.9; US-Chile Art. 10.9; US-Singapore Art. 15.8). Just as under the WTO 
and EU agreements, countries retain their affirmative rights to provide 
infrastructure, direct credit, and provide administrative guidance. 
Capital controls and transfer restrictions    In addition to governing direct 
investment, countries have employed capital controls or other international 
transfer or payment restrictions to promote and stabilize development. Under 
the current trade agreements, however, they may no longer do this. The 
WTO, EU agreements and US agreements all prohibit international transfer 
or payment restrictions presumptively (GATS Art. XI; DR-CAFTA Art. 10.8, 
11.10; NAFTA Art. 1109; US-Chile Art. 10.8; US-Singapore Art. 8.10, 15.7; 
EU-Chile Art. 163; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Title III; EU-Tunisia Art. 
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33; EU-S.A Art. 33).51 The difference here lies in the exception: both the 
WTO and EU agreements permit such restrictions only in the case of “seri-
ous balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof,” 
which is the primary purpose for such measures (GATS Art. XII; EU-Chile 
Arts. 166, 195; EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Arts. 30-31; EU-S.A. Arts. 
32-34; EU-Tunisia Art. 35). The US model diverges from this by omitting a 
provision that allows payments and transfers restrictions for balance of pay-
ments difficulties. Rather than imposing additional affirmative constraints, 
US agreements limit policymakers here by omission.
A different model: South-South investment regulation protection    
 Contrary to the disciplines for services trade, investment provisions in the 
various trading regimes reveal two distinct models of North-South investment 
discipline. While the EU, in the main, echoes the commitments of the parties 
under TRIMS, the US has established a model investment provision that 
limits the policies available to increase diversity and development. In response 
to this, some developing countries have created South-South trading relation-
ships that protect regional firms and thus promote regional development.
Investment protection disciplines make up the section that exhibits the greatest 
divergence between regimes. The WTO lays the ground rules with its illustra-
tive list of prohibited measures. EU-Chile begins to add to WTO commitments 
with its provision on establishment, but the other EU agreements do not seem 
to be following suit. US agreements impose many heightened restrictions by 
prohibiting most performance requirements placed on foreign firms and by not 
allowing capital controls even for balance of payments difficulties. On the other 
end of the spectrum, S-S agreements employ investment liberalization within 
the region to protect countries against foreign investors from outside the region.
Contrary to what one might expect, the investment disciplines under the 
CAN and MERCOSUR52 liberalize extensively while protecting the eco-
nomic and development interests of the region.53 These agreements both 
51. It should be noted that under the EU agreements, Chile reserved a hefty exception for their investment law 
600, and Mexico retains an exception for exchange and monetary difficulties in addition to balance of payments.
52. Neither China-Chile nor SAFTA has yet included investment provisions and MERCOSUR has little 
to add in the way of enhancing policy flexibility.
53. For example, the MERCOSUR Protocol on Investment Promotion and Protection contains the same 
national treatment standard as that provided under US agreements (Art. 3).  Likewise, CAN Decision 
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echo provisions of N-S agreements and enforce origin and ownership 
requirements on foreign firms in order for them to qualify for protection 
under the regime. In CAN Decision 292, for example, companies must be 
owned at least 60 percent by national investors of two or more Commu-
nity Members (Art. 1(d)). The same Decision requires that for any country 
whose investor contributes at least 15 percent of the capital for the enter-
prise, one of the directors must be a national of that country (Art. 1(e)).
S-S trade agreements exhibit the marriage of substantial liberalization and 
regional protection. Here, investment liberalization between trading part-
ners has been used both to open up markets and to protect nascent indus-
try. The nature of the trading partner makes a difference, however, as the 
bargaining and informational asymmetries between developed and develop-
ing countries may lead to N-S arrangements placing undesired constraints 
on policymakers. Beyond investment protection, one more area of “trade-
related” disciplines has drawn the attention of international human rights 
groups and developing nations alike. The following section addresses the 
fourth and final set of trade disciplines: intellectual property rules (IPRs).
International Intellectual Property Protection
An area at least as highly controversial as investment protection provisions, IPRs 
have been a primary method by which countries have attempted to walk the 
fine line between global integration and domestic development. Countries have 
tried to correct informational asymmetries and create financial incentives for 
inventors, all the while protecting private property. This balance has become 
particularly contentious when protecting private property leads to making nec-
essary medicines unavailable to populations most in need (Shadlen 2005, 23). 
Historically, wealthier countries or knowledge exporters have tended to prioritize 
incentives for knowledge creation, while poor countries or knowledge importers 
have prioritized incentives for knowledge dissemination (Shadlen 2005, 6). 
Today, however, the global trade regime has placed increasing limits on the 
ability of developing countries to prioritize such dissemination. In the area of 
patents, for example, countries have a more difficult time protecting tradi-
292 allows multinational enterprises the right to establish subsidiaries, transfer payments freely, and 
transfer their domicile freely (Art. 15ff ).
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tional knowledge of plants and animals, as well as permitting use of the patent 
application information for related experimentation. Although countries 
retain some flexibilities to promote local knowledge and address public needs 
through compulsory licensing and utility models, the trend shows increased 
protection for inventors and additional constraints on policymakers.
International intellectual property protection rules have come under attack, in 
part, because of their adverse effect on medicinal availability in the develop-
ing world. For that reason, the WTO 
issued the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (Doha 
Declaration), which emphasized the 
importance of developing country 
concerns about their access to medi-
cines. Despite the controversy, the US 
has continued to push for stronger 
inventor incentives at the expense of policy flexibility. Table 8 provides a broad 
picture of the policy constraints in this arena and demonstrates how US agree-
ments exceed the rules under other trade regimes.
Table 8.  Intellectual Property Checklist
 WTO and     
 Associated US EU
Policy Instrument Agreements Agreements Agreements
Patent restriction by industry/origin N N N
Limitations on patent terms N N N
Patent refusals/revocations Y Y+54  Y
Limit IP protection for plants/animals Y N Y+
Permit early-working on patented  Y N Y 
pharmaceuticals
Compulsory licensing Y Y+ Y
Local production requirement Y N Y
Parallel imports Y N Y+
Limiting patent breadth Y Y Y
Utility models Y Y Y
Narrow patentability requirements Y N Y
54. A [+] sign indicates that the practice is permitted with some procedural requirements in addition to 
those under TRIPS.
International intellectual property 
protection rules have come under at-
tack, in part, because of their adverse 
effect on medicinal availability in the 
developing world.
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Patent restriction by industry, origin, or duration    In this one question, 
the three regimes under scrutiny concur. Patent restriction by industry, ori-
gin, or duration is patently (no pun intended) prohibited under the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO, 
stating that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products 
or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” (Art. 27.1). This 
language is echoed in all US bilateral and regional agreements and likewise 
incorporated into most EU agreements by reference (NAFTA Art. 1709; 
DR-CAFTA Art. 15.9; US-Chile Art. 17.9; US-Singapore Art. 16.7; EU-
Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 36(1)(a); EU-Chile Art. 170(a)(i); EU-S.A. 
Art. 46).55 
Further, under TRIPS, all patents must last for 20 years, at a minimum 
(Art. 33). Regarding the length of the patents, only NAFTA mentions the 
actual minimum while the rest simply assume a 20-year minimum (Art. 
1709(12)). In addition, some agreements restrict a country’s ability to re-
voke patents where they deem necessary or important. Under TRIPS (and, 
thus, the EU regime), countries may do so in accordance with their national 
law, so long as they make judicial review of the administrative decision 
available (Art. 32). US agreements have added to this that “a patent may be 
revoked or canceled only on grounds that would have justified a refusal to 
grant the patent” (DR-CAFTA Art. 15.9(4); US-Chile Art. 17.9(5); US-
Singapore Art. 16.7(4); NAFTA Art. 1709.8). The US model once more 
shows itself distinct by raising the legal standard for patent revocation.
Limited plant and animal protection    Patent protection for plants and 
animals is a relatively new phenomenon. Although plant and animal species 
are generally found in nature (and therefore not new or innovative), the de-
veloped world has sought additional protection for genetically modified plant 
species—a move that has placed in jeopardy some of the traditional cultural 
knowledge established by native populations. Under all modern international 
intellectual property protection regimes, some protection for plant and animal 
55. EU-Tunisia constitutes the exception here, where TRIPS is not even mentioned in the section on 
IPRs.
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life is required. TRIPS states that countries may “exclude from patentability . . . 
plants and animals other than microorganisms.” However they must “provide 
for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui ge-
neris system or by any combination thereof” (Art. 27). Although the provision 
requires some protection, the phrase “effective sui generis system” provides for 
a lot of theoretical flexibility for developing countries to establish their own 
plant protection systems—a flexibility that many countries have exploited 
(Shadlen 2005, 13). 
Typically, EU agreements do not expand much on the provisions of TRIPS. 
Instead they mention various international conventions and agreements 
(including TRIPS) as a part of the requirements for the trade agreement 
(EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 36; EU-Chile Art. 170; EU-S.A. Art. 46; 
EU-Tunisia Annex 7).56 By incorporating TRIPS, EU agreements seem to 
retain similar flexibilities. One key difference, however, lies in the frequent EU 
provision requiring that parties accede to the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), either from 1978 or 1991.57 
This represents a slight decrease in policy flexibility by specifying which type 
of plant protection is acceptable.58 
Under the US agreements, once more, the disciplines on IPRs are much 
tighter. All modern agreements required the parties to ratify or accede to 
the UPOV 1991 (DR-CAFTA Art. 15.1(5); US-Chile Art. 17.1(3); US-
Singapore Art. 16.1(2)).59 Furthermore, most recent agreements demand 
that contracting states make every effort to impose a plant patenting system 
56. Incorporation of these agreements comes by various means.  In some, the parties simply confirm 
their existing obligations, while, in others, the parties affirmatively undertake to become a party of the 
convention.
57. The key difference between the 1978 and 1991 conventions is found in the allowance of third parties 
“to use protected seeds and plants for breeding new varieties.” UPOV 1978 included a farmers exception 
allowing them to reuse seeds.  This exception was eliminated under UPOV 1991, “which provides much 
stronger rights to breeders” (Shadlen 2005, 13).
58. Under EU-Chile, the parties “continue to ensure an adequate and effective implementation of” 
UPOV 1978 or UPOV 1991 (Art. 170(a)(v).  EU-Mexico likewise contains the flexibility of choosing 
UPOV 1978 or UPOV 1991 and states that the parties “confirm the importance they attach to” the 
convention (EU-Mexico Decision 2/2001 Art. 36(2).  Under EU-South Africa, the parties also “confirm 
the importance they attach to” UPOV 1978, and Tunisia has committed to accede to UPOV 1991 by 
the fourth year “after the entry into force of the Agreement” (EU-S.A. Art.46(5)(c); EU-Tunisia Annex 
7(1)).
59. Once more, the exception is NAFTA (NAFTA Art. 1701.2).
2 The Pardee Papers | No. 2 | September 2008  
(DR-CAFTA Art. 15.9(2); US-Chile Art. 17.9(2)). Under US-Singapore, 
plant patenting is required automatically by excluding the TRIPS provision 
that allows members to exclude plants from patentability (US-Singapore 
Art. 16.7(a)).
Permitting use of patent application information    Another technique 
to promote knowledge dissemination employed by some countries is to 
establish strict information disclosure requirements to make more informa-
tion readily available to generics producers and domestic inventors trying 
to build off the patented invention, or to allow some early working on 
patented pharmaceuticals. TRIPS provides countries with more flexibility 
than with US agreements in deciding how much information to require 
(Art. 29). All WTO members must “require that an applicant for a patent 
shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for 
the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” Additionally, 
countries “may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying 
out the invention known to the inventor at the filing date,” thus permitting 
heightened information requirements (Art. 29.1, emphasis added). 
Some US agreements, by contrast, (possibly those where domestic patent 
regimes do not protect US interests satisfactorily) lower the amount of in-
formation that may be demanded. Under DR-CAFTA, for example, parties 
to the agreement may not ask more of the patent applicant than the “infor-
mation that allows the invention to be made and used by a person skilled in 
the art, without undue experimentation, as of the filing date” (Art. 15.9(9)).
Early-working or “Bolar” provisions permit “firms to develop, test, and 
apply for registration of generic versions of patented drugs, to be put on 
the market once the protected drugs’ patent terms expire” (Shadlen 2005, 
19). Under TRIPS early working is permitted so long as it is not used for 
commercial production or stockpiling purposes.60 The actual text states 
only vaguely that member states must protect data whose origin “involves 
considerable effort . . . from unfair commercial use” (TRIPS Art. 39.3). EU 
agreements, for reasons stated previously, incorporate the same legal lan-
60. This standard has been determined by WTO case law and is not necessarily clear from the text of the 
agreement (Shadlen 2005, 18-19).
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guage and, presumably, the same legal standard. The US model, however, 
more specifically proscribes early-working by protecting submitted data for 
regulatory approval for five years “against both disclosure and reliance” (DR-
CAFTA Art. 15.10(1)). As Shadlen notes, this applies irrespective of patent-
ing, since information protection exists for any product requiring approval 
before marketing (Shadlen 2005, 19). 
Compulsory licensing    Governments grant compulsory licenses (CLs) 
to domestic industry to make and distribute certain patented products, 
especially pharmaceuticals, without the consent of the patent holder. They 
grant them largely to access needed technology where the country cannot 
obtain access through traditionally negotiated licenses (Shadlen 2005, 21). 
TRIPS permits CLs subject to that procedural requirements within Article 
31. Article 31 requires that each license be considered individually, that the 
proposed user make efforts “to obtain authorization from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms” over a reasonable period of time (except 
in situations of national emergency), that the scope and duration be limited 
to a specific purpose, that the use be non-exclusive and non-assignable, that 
it be for the domestic market of the granting government, and that it be 
subject to judicial review, among other procedural requirements.
On this point, both EU and US agreements largely incorporate the terms 
of Article 31. According to some, bilateral and regional agreements often 
circumscribe the rights of governments to grant compulsory licenses 
(Shadlen 2005, 24). Evidence of this can be seen in the texts of US agree-
ments stating that the “subject matter of a subsisting patent to support an 
application for marketing approval or sanitary permit of a pharmaceutical 
product . . . shall not be made, used or sold in the territory of the Party 
other than for purposes related to meeting the requirements of such ap-
proval” (DR-CAFTA Art. 15.9(5); US-Chile Art. 17.9(4); US-Singapore 
Art. 16.7(5)). The US-Singapore agreement even says that the subject 
matter of a patent may only be used to remedy anti-competitive practices, 
for public non-commercial use or in the case of national emergency, thus 
restricting the use of CLs further (Art. 16.7(6)).
Additional flexibilities    In addition to the above, countries have em-
ployed several other measures to encourage national experimentation and 
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promote development. TRIPS allows countries to require patent owners to 
produce locally thus encouraging “the transfer of non-codified, tacit knowl-
edge that occurs via the localization of manufacturing operations” (Shadlen 
2005, 22). Both Brazil and India have exploited this flexibility as they aim 
to promote their industrial development. TRIPS also allows countries to 
determine their own “exhaustion” policies—whether national, regional or 
international—permitting parallel imports as soon as the patent holder loses 
exclusive privileges.61 Governments may further narrow the interpretation of 
the general patentability requirements—that the invention be new, non-ob-
vious, and useful—such that inventors must reach a higher standard to re-
ceive a domestic patent (TRIPS Art. 27.1). They may narrow the breadth of 
the patent so that only a very narrow application is patented, leaving room 
for creative expansion on existing patents by domestic scientists. Finally, 
they may establish protection for “utility models,” inventions that may not 
quite reach the level of patentability but which may provide local residents 
with incentives for experimentation (Shadlen 2005, 15-16). Since neither 
patent breadth nor utility models are addressed under TRIPS, countries 
enjoy the broad freedom to employ them as they like.
Since EU agreements intellectual property provisions only slightly exceed 
TRIPS disciplines, presumably the same flexibilities exist. What is surpris-
ing is that US agreements have little to say on the subjects as well. Govern-
ments may interpret “new, non-obvious, and useful” in many ways even 
under US rules. In addition, neither patent breadth nor utility models have 
been addressed in US agreements and therefore are fair game for policymak-
ers. A few agreements, however, have begun to infringe on these additional 
flexibilities. Recent US agreements require a broad interpretation of the 
term “new,” allowing an invention even 12 months old to qualify for the 
novelty requirement (DR-CAFTA Art. 15.9(7); US-Chile Art. 17.9(7)). US 
61. Carsten Fink explains the difference between exhaustion policies: 
 “Under a system of national exhaustion, a title holder can prevent parallel importation of his 
product from a foreign country, where it is sold either by the IPR’s owner himself or by an authorized 
dealer. In contrast, if rights exhaust internationally, the title-holder loses his exclusive privilege after the 
first distribution of his product, thus allowing parallel imports from abroad. A hybrid between national 
and international exhaustion is regional exhaustion, whereby parallel trading is allowed within a particu-
lar group of countries but parallel imports from countries outside the region are banned” (Fink 1999, 
173). 
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agreements also effectively prohibit parallel importation due to its national 
exhaustion policies (Shadlen 2005, 20). 
Additional constraints under US agreements    US agreements do not stop 
there; they seek additional protection for intellectual property in a number of 
other ways. All recent agreements establish mandatory patent term extensions 
in the case of “unreasonable delays” (US-Chile Art. 17.9(6); DR-CAFTA Art. 
15.9(6); US-Singapore Art. 16.7(7)). This phrase contains inherent vague-
ness that could be interpreted to give transnational companies more leverage 
against host governments. Several other provisions act to effectively extend the 
patent term by protecting the information in the patent application as well as 
the subject matter of the patent. With the exception of NAFTA, US agree-
ments require an additional five years of protection for pharmaceutical safety 
certification data (US-Chile Art. 17.10(1); DR-CAFTA Art. 15.10(1)(a); 
US-Singapore Art. 16.8(1)). DR-CAFTA, the most restrictive in terms of 
patent protection of the US agreements studied, also establishes a five year safe 
zone for any product patented in another country, allowing notification to the 
second country within five years (Art. 15.10(1)(b)). Furthermore, US patent 
term marketing restrictions may create an effective ban on compulsory licens-
ing—though such licenses are internationally recognized—according to some 
analysts (Art. 15.10(2); Abbott 2004, 14). 
South-South responses and the US model    Intellectual property 
protection provides another clear picture of two emerging models of free 
trade agreements. While the EU 
agreements add almost noth-
ing to the commitments within 
TRIPS, the US demands much 
more of its partnering nations. 
By restricting early-working, 
requiring heightened protection 
for plant species, and effectively extending the terms of patent protec-
tion through mandatory extensions and data protection, US agreements 
represent a distinct model of international IPR discipline.
For developing countries, intellectual property rights, as a new area of trade-
related issues, has yet to be addressed under many of these agreements as 
Intellectual property protection 
provides another clear picture of 
two emerging models of free trade 
agreements.
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well. Neither SAFTA nor China-Chile covers IPRs and MERCOSUR has 
yet to cover patents, the most important of IPRs for purposes of develop-
ment. The CAN, however, provides a model S-S arrangement that includes 
intellectual property provisions that promote the interests of the nations in 
that region. First of all, the CAN expressly protects biological and genetic 
heritage and traditional knowledge by subjecting patent applications “on the 
basis of material obtained from that heritage or that knowledge” to interna-
tional, Andean Community and national law with respect to acquisition of 
that material (CAN IPRS Art. 3). In addition, the Decision governing IPRs 
exludes from patentability scientific theories, mathematical methods; living 
things (whatever the size); literary and artistic works or any other aesthetic 
creation protected by copyright; plans, rules, and methods for the pursuit of 
intellectual activities, playing of games, or economic and business activi-
ties; computer programs and software, as such; and, methods for presenting 
information (CAN IPRs Art. 15).
In addition to patenting restrictions, the Decisions of the CAN Secretariat 
apply an international standard for exhaustion, providing maximum op-
portunity for parallel imports (CAN IPRs Art. 54; Musungu 2004, 51). 
Compulsory licensing remains available where there is a failure to exploit 
(either through manufacture or import), in the case of “public interest, an 
emergency or national security considerations,” or in order “to correct anti-
competitive practices” (CAN IPRs Arts. 61-66). Finally, the IPRs Decision 
makes explicit room for utility models, which can encourage a lower degree 
of innovation often “more appropriate for local firms” (CAN IPRs Arts. 81-
85; Shadlen 2005, 16).
In this one trade-related area, more than any other, some developing 
countries are making strides to protect their traditional knowledge and 
safeguard their public health. This area also provides clear evidence of the 
emergence of two distinct N-S trade agreement models. While the EU 
models have exceeded WTO disciplines on a slight scale, the US imposes 
multiple additional requirements that prioritize property right protection 
over information dissemination. 
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IV. SuMMARy AND CoNCLuSIoNS
The analysis of various types of trade agreements shows that the current 
global trade regime substantially curtails the ability of countries to main-
tain control over various policy tools that traditionally have been deployed 
as part of long-run development paths.62 Under the WTO, despite the 
constraint on policy space, there remains considerable room to maneuver. 
Countries may legally raise and lower tariffs, provide tax-related export 
incentives such as drawbacks and deferrals within EPZs, impose perfor-
mance requirements on investors and service providers, and employ domes-
tic patent laws to prioritize information dissemination over incentives for 
invention. The WTO also makes room for countries to form bilateral and 
regional trade agreements under the GATT (Art. XXIV).
Despite wide variation among Article XXIV agreements, policy space 
under North-South free trade agreements is the most constraining on the 
traditional industrial development toolkit. Among the countries to form 
bilateral and regional trade arrangements, the US and the EU are the most 
influential. Overwhelmingly, among both trade agreements and the global 
trade regime, the trend heads toward increased liberalization and decreased 
government intervention in the economy. At the same time, some types 
of agreements continue to make space for the policies aimed at industrial 
development, while others push for broader and deeper liberalization. Trade 
agreements with the EU, for example, retain much of the flexibility under 
the WTO in the areas of investment and intellectual property, and employ 
the same positive-list approach as the GATS. By contrast, the US imposes 
many additional disciplines on its trading partners—expanding patent 
protection, mandating investment liberalization, and employing a nega-
tive-list approach to services bindings. Over the past 15 years, trade regimes 
have formed around these principles and US trade policy has become more 
uniform. Meanwhile, EU trade policy varies much more greatly by trading 
partner, indicating a greater willingness to retain policy flexibility. Provided 
this trend continues, countries that are still developing in 30 years will have 
62. Part of the reason for this is that, with the spread of globalization, no issue is truly “uniquely” domes-
tic. Even though industry standards, licensures, and certifications may be matters of domestic law, they 
impact foreign companies and, by extension, foreign governments.
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more opportunity to creatively use their policy space under an EU agree-
ment than under an agreement with the US.
Many S-S agreements are also established under Article XXIV; yet they 
often provide the greatest policy space among the agreements studied. This 
flexibility derives not from lacking affirmative trade disciplines but from 
using trade liberalization between developing countries to protect industries 
and promote growth regionally. Investment and intellectual property rules 
under the CAN provide the clearest example here. The CAN rules of origin 
establish protection for regional firms against extra-regional companies. 
In addition, the CAN explicitly protects traditional knowledge, tightens 
patentability requirements and makes room for local, non-patentable 
innovation.
Still, some policy space remains under even the most restrictive trading 
schemes. The self-enforcing nature of dispute resolution, for example, allows 
smaller countries to undertake virtually any policy that does not economi-
cally injure its larger trading partners. Furthermore, to the extent the state 
is economically capable, it may invest heavily in public education, subsidize 
credit to certain industries, and build up domestic infrastructure. Using 
a method employed by developing and developed countries alike, policy 
makers may also provide administrative guidance—marketing the country, 
its location, natural resources, and workforce, for example—to investors 
and traders internationally. This technique may help a country to target an 
industry that would transfer technology or provide backward and forward 
linkages in the economy.
This paper is far from the final word on this subject. Indeed, it may perhaps 
raise more questions than those that are answered. Each subject could be its 
own separate paper, pursuing in more depth the implied and actual flex-
ibilities inherent in the global trading regime. For that reason, this paper 
aims only to give an overview of the policies available to countries today, 
and point out some significant differences between the various types of 
trade agreements. Going forward, interesting ideas for further research are 
numerous. A legal analysis of the dispute settlement cases under each regime 
would shed more light on the extent to which the rules against selective pol-
icies have actually been enforced. Political scientists might explore whether 
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the divergence within international regimes, such as that of the EU-Latin 
American agreements and the EU-African agreements, is rooted in the geog-
raphy of the trading partners, their development level, or other factors. 
From a policy perspective, it is our hope that negotiators and policymak-
ers who have or are considering crafting longer-run development strate-
gies can use this paper as a reference 
when deciding under which policy 
regimes such development strategies 
would be most permissible. Just shy 
of 60 percent of the people on the 
planet live in poverty, measured by 
the World Bank as less than $2.50 
per day. To raise the standard of 
living for those people, governments 
seek to put together long-term de-
velopment strategies that deploy the 
policy instruments that have proven 
successful in other settings. This paper catalogues many of the policies 
deployed by successful developed and developing countries that over a 
35+ year period tripled the average incomes of many countries such as the 
US, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China. We show that today, 
however, poorer nations have a more limited toolkit to engage in long-run 
development strategies, and that the trade arrangements they form will 
have an influence on the policies they will have available in the future.
 
Just shy of 0 percent of the people 
on the planet live in poverty, measured 
by the World Bank as less than $2.0 
per day. To raise the standard of living 
for those people, governments seek to 
put together long-term development 
strategies that deploy the policy in-
struments that have proven successful 
in other settings.
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